InDepth: World Wide Water Mafia #08: Political Involvement and Control of Illegal Water
IC InDepth Team
Mumbai, 30 August 2019
A clear recognition of these dynamics is evident in countries like India and Pakistan, where local politicians actively engage with and attempt to regulate the illicit water supply.
These politicians often aim to exert control over, or at the very least, gain a share of the revenues from the underground water distribution.
Notably, they strategically integrate water-related promises into their campaigns, capitalizing on the crucial importance of water issues.
Political Party Influence on Water Distribution
Partisan workers aligned with various political parties vie for contracts to lay pipes, both legal and illegal, that connect communal boreholes (many of which may already be unauthorized) to slum dwellers, such as those residing in Delhi’s Sangam Vihar.
Typically, these workers charge households fees ranging from 50 to 500 rupees (approximately $0.79 to $7.90) for their services.
This practice often provides a direct source of income for the political parties. Some politicians even exert direct control over the illicit pipelines, demanding monthly fees from slum households in exchange for maintaining water supply.
Despite its lack of accountability and fairness, this form of water governance tends to be more efficient than official state regulation, even extending to middle-class neighborhoods.
Politicians as Intermediaries in the Water Economy
Local politicians further solidify their influence by mediating the access of illegal water suppliers and ensuring the unimpeded delivery of water through government-authorized trucks, often facilitated through bribes.
Through these multifaceted roles, politicians act as intermediaries bridging the gap between the state apparatus, slum communities, and the illicit water economy.
This intricate web of influence extends beyond water affairs, as politicians also require broader contributions to their political parties and garner support in the form of votes from local residents.
AAP’s Electoral Success and Water Supply Promises
The AAP political party’s remarkable success in Delhi’s 2013 elections wasn’t solely based on its broad anti-corruption and populist platform.
It also hinged on its commitment to enhance water supply accessibility and affordability, with some pledges even leaning towards free water distribution.
In the Sangam Vihar slum, AAP representatives aimed to introduce market liberalization to the water sector, weakening the grip of water tanker mafias and their political affiliations.
Raids, Associations, and Water User Empowerment
AAP organized raids targeting illegal boreholes and established water user associations comprised of individuals “recommended” by local residents, though the practicality of the selection process remained unclear.
These associations were intended to ensure fair water distribution and monitor private operators of government-owned boreholes. Within two years, over 100 such associations emerged within the slum.
However, a significant twist occurred as these associations swiftly fell under the sway of politically-connected operators who had been controlling the wells prior to the associations’ inception.
Domination by Water Dons and Community Fees
In a paradoxical turn, rather than democratizing water access and oversight, the pre-existing political influence of water dons enabled them to assert dominance within the new frameworks.
The water dons, often major figures in the illicit water supply chain, reasserted control and collected fees from the local community.
These fees were ostensibly earmarked for pump and pipe maintenance, as well as for employees overseeing the wells’ operation.
Community Participation in Brazil: Porto Alegre’s Pro-Poor Approach
In contrast, Brazil’s Porto Alegre implemented a proactive strategy to engage the impoverished in water-related decision-making processes.
Through participatory budgeting and expenditure reviews, citizens played an active role.
This engagement led to a remarkable surge in water access, climbing from 80 percent coverage in 1989 to nearly universal coverage by 1996. Similarly, sanitation access escalated from under 50 percent to 85 percent.
To enhance the influence of the most disadvantaged, votes of the poorest individuals were weighted more heavily, ensuring a pro-poor focus in water governance.
Political Patronage and Illegal Water Supply in Pakistan
In Pakistan’s rural regions, politicians who offer illicit water supply surpassing allocated quotas enjoy significant political backing, allowing them to maintain their positions for extended periods.
This mutually beneficial relationship empowers them to ensure job security, provide extralegal perks, and facilitate the promotion of pliable and corrupt water officials who overlook their illegal activities. This self-sustaining system has persisted for decades.
Bangladesh’s Water Control: Role of Mastaans in Slum Areas
In Bangladesh, individuals controlling illicit water distribution within slums often expand their influence to encompass broader slum management, earning the title of Mastaans.
Beyond water provision, Mastaans also coordinate the establishment of other vital infrastructures, including sanitation, electricity, and road paving.
While state entities and NGOs also provide water to marginalized areas, the dominance of Mastaans in facilitating illegal water connections remains prominent.
Their activities are frequently sanctioned and coordinated with the acquiescence of state officials, water commission representatives, and even the police.
Often linked with political parties, similar to India, Mastaans collect “voluntary” contributions for political allies and ensure votes in their favor.
These figures are also known for extorting resources and exerting control over slum areas, often through organized acts of violence.
Water Mismanagement and Corruption in Bangladesh
Despite Bangladesh’s abundant water resources, access to clean drinking water and proper sanitation remains limited for a significant portion of the population.
Even legally-piped water often carries bacterial contamination, coupled with sporadic supply that might last only a few hours a day, even in middle-class neighborhoods.
Manipulation of water meters, false billing, and affluent individuals evading water fees contribute to a perpetual resource shortage, hindering efforts to enhance the water supply and extend it to broader segments of the populace.
Slum Challenges and Dominance of Mastaans
Slums face even more severe inadequacies in water delivery. Often devoid of formal legal water distribution systems, these areas experience water fees that can be two to three times higher per liter than in more privileged neighborhoods.
Unfortunately, privately and illicitly provided water in slums is frequently contaminated and unsuitable for consumption.
Nonetheless, the influence of Mastaans over these communities is so potent that they resort to suspending water delivery as a coercive tactic, exacerbating water scarcity within the slums during such periods.
Profit-Driven Disruptions in India and Nigeria
Providers of illicit water to areas without legal access wield significant political influence, yet their intentions are far from benevolent or transparent.
In India, local politicians and water tanker operators often resort to violent means, such as inciting riots and unrest, to thwart government initiatives aimed at extending legitimate water infrastructure to marginalized communities.
Their motivations are rooted in the preservation of their profits and political clout.
A similar pattern emerges in Lagos, Nigeria, where efforts by the government to expand authorized water distribution are met with forceful opposition and intimidation from local water mafia groups, collaborating politicians, and slum landlords who benefit from unequal and illicit water allocation.
In their pursuit of financial gain and power, these actors may even destroy public water sources, further exacerbating the problem.
Despite their actions, the water they provide is not only more costly but often contaminated, contributing to the spread of contagious diseases.
It’s worth noting that community pushback and competition among these “water mafia” entities have not led to improved services or the elimination of the worst offenders.
Ecuador’s Struggle for Control
In Ecuador, a similar narrative unfolds as water mafias and licensed vendors alike resist the expansion of public water supply, sometimes resorting to violent means.
Their aim is to maintain control over the illegal and privatized water market, drive up prices for their unlawful services, and tighten their grip on local neighborhoods.
This opposition often involves damaging existing water networks and infrastructure.
These actions not only hinder the establishment of legal and regulated water provision but also perpetuate the dominance of the informal water market and its associated problems.
Competitive Informal Water Supply in Mozambique
Conversely, in Mozambique, the informal water provider landscape differs.
With over 200 small-scale suppliers offering water from unregulated boreholes in the capital city of Maputo, a competitive environment has emerged.
While this supply remains unauthorized and possibly illegal based on its sourcing, the behavior of informal water providers is markedly less problematic compared to the extensive issues posed by water mafias in South Asia.
Furthermore, pricing in this context tends to be more equitable, providing a contrast to the exploitative practices seen in other regions.
Uneven Legitimacy and Challenges in Kenya
The presence of an established legal public water supply doesn’t inherently guarantee equitable distribution or eliminate feelings of coercion.
In Kenya, for instance, more than half of Nairobi’s households connected to the legal water supply expressed dissatisfaction with their bills. However, due to the fear of disconnection, they hesitated to challenge the accuracy of their charges. This highlights how even within legal frameworks, issues of fairness and coercion can persist.
Next: InDepth: World Wide Water Mafia #09: Variability in Legal and Illegal Markets
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